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Abstract
In this note we study von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets for Shapley and
Scarf (1974) housing markets. Kawasaki (2008) shows that the set of competitive alloca-
tions coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted
version of antisymmetric weak dominance (cf., Wako, 1999). We demonstrate that the set
of competitive allocations also coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable
set based on a farsighted version of strong dominance (cf., Roth and Postlewaite, 1977) if no
individual is indiﬀerent between his endowment and the endowment of someone else.
JEL classification: D63, D70.
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1 Introduction
We consider Shapley and Scarf’s (1974) housing market model in which each agent is endowed
with a house, has (not necessarily strict) preferences over the set of houses in the market, and
wishes to consume exactly one house. Recently, this model has been successfully applied to the
allocation of student housing with existing tenants (e.g., Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1999) and
kidney exchange (e.g., Roth et al., 2004).1
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1An exchange of student housing is identical to a housing market if every student is already assigned to a room
(i.e., is a tenant). For kidney exchange, a housing market describes the situation in which every patient (who
requires one kidney) also provides a (possibly incompatible) donor (of one kidney). For an overview of the recent
literature on allocation and exchange of indivisible goods see So¨nmez and U¨nver (2009).
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The most prominent solution concepts for housing markets are the set of competitive al-
locations and the core. Shapley and Scarf (1974) show that the set of competitive allocations
coincides with the set of outcomes of the Top Trading Cycles Algorithm attributed to David Gale
by Shapley and Scarf (1974). For strict preferences, Roth and Postlewaite (1977) demonstrate
that the unique competitive allocation coincides with the unique allocation in the strong core
(i.e., the core deﬁned in terms of weak dominance). In the case of indiﬀerences, the strong core
may be empty and the non-empty weak core (i.e., the core based on strong dominance) may
exceed the (not necessarily singleton) set of competitive allocations. Wako (1999) proposes a
core based on antisymmetric weak dominance and shows that it coincides with the set of com-
petitive allocations. An allocation is antisymmetrically weakly dominated by another allocation
if it is weakly dominated and agents in the blocking coalition who are indiﬀerent between the
old and the new allocation consume the same house in both allocations. Hence, antisymmetric
weak dominance is more restrictive than weak dominance but implied by strong dominance.
Toda (1997) shows that the set of competitive allocations also coincides with the unique von
Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on antisymmetric weak dominance.
Harsanyi (1974) criticizes the underlying assumption of these notions of (direct) dominance
that agents are myopic in the sense that a blocking coalition forms whenever it beneﬁts (weakly
or strongly) from redistributing its endowments. A coalition might well enforce a myopically
not very attractive outcome (i.e., the redistribution of endowments makes some members of
the blocking coalition worse oﬀ) in order to set a chain of events in motion that in the end
will lead to a preferred outcome for everyone in the coalition. Following this line of thought,
Kawasaki (2008) demonstrates that the set of competitive allocations coincides with the unique
von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set deﬁned in terms of a farsighted version of Wako’s (1999)
antisymmetric weak dominance.
In this paper, we show that the set of competitive allocations coincides with the unique von
Neumann-Morgenstern stable set deﬁned in terms of a farsighted version of strong dominance, if
no agent is indiﬀerent between his initial endowment and the endowment of another agent. This
preference restriction seems to be realistic for standard applications of housing market models.
For instance, it is reasonable to assume that a patient/donor pair strictly prefers its own donor
kidney to any kidney with the same medical characteristics, while it also strictly prefers any
kidney with better medical characteristics to its own. Likewise, a tenant strictly prefers his
own room to any room with identical characteristics —he likes to avoid moving—, while he also
strictly prefers any room with distinctly better characteristics to his own. Hence, we give a
farsighted characterization of the set of competitive allocations in a housing market based on
strong dominance (i.e., a stronger dominance relation than the one used in Kawasaki, 2008) on
a restricted preference domain. In fact, we demonstrate that this is a maximal domain. More
precisely, we provide an example in which (i) one agent is indiﬀerent between his endowment
and the endowment of one other agent and (ii) the set of competitive allocations is not a von
Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on our farsighted version of strong dominance.
In Section 2 we introduce the model. We present our results in Section 3.
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2 Housing Markets
We consider housing markets as introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). Let N = {1, . . . , n},
n ≥ 2, be the set of agents. Each agent i ∈ N is endowed with one object denoted by ei = i.
Thus, N also denotes the set of objects.
Allocations An allocation is an assignment of objects such that each agent receives exactly
one object, i.e., an allocation is a vector x = (xi)i∈N ∈ NN such that
(i) for each i ∈ N , xi ∈ N denotes the object that agent i consumes, e.g., if xi = j, then agent
i receives agent j’s endowment, and
(ii) no object is assigned to more than one agent, i.e., ∪i∈N{xi} = N.
Let X denote the set of allocations.
Trading Cycles An allocation x can be represented by a directed graph g with the set of
nodes N and a directed edge from agent i to agent j if agent i consumes the endowment of
agent j, i.e., xi = j. A directed edge from i to itself (a loop) thus represents the case that agent
i consumes his endowment at allocation x, i.e., xi = ei. As each agent is assigned to exactly one
object, the graph displays a partition of the set of agents N into L ≤ |N | = n sets of agents who
belong to the same connected component C l (l = 1, ..., L). We call a connected component C l
a trading cycle and with some abuse of notation C l also denotes the set of agents in the cycle.
For any i ∈ C l, we say that agent i trades in trading cycle C l. Sometimes we denote trading
cycle C l for allocation x and agent i ∈ C l by Cx,i.
Markets Each agent i ∈ N has complete and transitive preferences Ri over objects. We
denote the strict part of Ri by Pi and the indiﬀerence part of Ri by Ii. By R we denote the set
of preferences over N and by RN = ×i∈NR we denote the set of (preference) profiles. Since the
set of agents and their endowments remain ﬁxed throughout, RN also denotes the set of housing
markets.
Top Trading Cycles Algorithm The Top Trading Cycles Algorithm, attributed to David
Gale by Shapley and Scarf (1974), computes a set of allocations that plays a central role in the
housing market literature.
Consider a directed graph gT with set of nodes N and directed edges determined by the following
iterative procedure.
Step 1: Each agent points to one of the agents whose endowment he prefers most. Since there
is a ﬁnite number of agents, there is at least one cycle. A directed edge from agent i to
agent j is drawn if i points at j and both are in a cycle. Each agent in a cycle is assigned
the house of the agent he points to and removed from the market with his assignment. If
there is at least one remaining agent, proceed with Step 2.
Step k: Each remaining agent points to one of the agents whose endowment he prefers most
among the remaining agents. Since there is a ﬁnite number of agents, there is at least one
cycle. A directed edge from agent i to agent j is drawn if i points at j and both are in a
cycle. Each agent in a cycle is assigned the house of the agent he points to and removed
from the market with his assignment. If there is at least one remaining agent, proceed
with Step k + 1.
3
As there are ﬁnitely many agents, the iterative procedure stops after a ﬁnite number of steps
and a graph gT results that partitions the set of agents into trading cycles, which in turn
deﬁne an allocation. Since preferences are not necessarily strict, an agent may be indiﬀerent
between the endowments of several agents (possibly including himself). Clearly, agents pointing
at diﬀerent (indiﬀerent) agents at a given step of the algorithm, might result in a diﬀerent
graph and a diﬀerent allocation. The set of all allocations that can be generated using the top
trading algorithm is called the set of top trading allocations. Remarkably, the set of top trading
allocations equals the set of competitive allocations (Shapley and Scarf, 1974).
To summarize, for given choices (i.e., tie-breaking of indiﬀerences in agents’ preferences) in
the top trading cycles algorithm, the graph gT determines an allocation x and a partition of
the set of agents N into L ≤ |N | top trading cycles C l (l = 1, ..., L). Moreover, the iterative
procedure provides a partition of the set of agents N into K ≤ L sets of agents Nk (k = 1, ...,K)
with Nk being the set of agents that is removed from the market in Step k. Note that each set
Nk is the union of a collection of (top) trading cycles at x.
3 Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets
We ﬁrst describe how a coalition of agents can enforce an allocation starting from another
allocation. We need the following notation. The set of feasible reallocations of objects among
the members of coalition S ⊆ N is denoted by XS = {(xi)i∈S ∈ ×i∈SN : ∪i∈S{xi} = S}. Let
y ∈ X and S ⊆ N . Then, by yS = (yi)i∈S we denote the restriction of allocation y to coalition S.
Moreover, y(S) = ∪i∈S{yi} denotes the set of objects that coalition S consumes at allocation y.
Enforceability We adopt Kawasaki’s (2008) enforceability notion. A coalition S of agents
can enforce an allocation y starting from an allocation x, denoted by x→S y, if
(E1) yS ∈ XS ;
(E2) yi = xi for all i ∈ N\S with x(S) ∩ Cx,i = ∅;
(E3) yi = ei for all i ∈ N\S with x(S) ∩ Cx,i = ∅.
That is, at allocation y, coalition S reallocates its endowment among itself (E1). If no object
in a trade cycle at x is involved in the reallocation, then the trade cycle is not aﬀected, i.e., it
is part of allocation y (E2). If some object in a trade cycle at x is involved in the reallocation,
then all agents in the trade cycle that are not in S consume their endowments (E3).
An allocation y indirectly dominates allocation x, denoted by y  x, if there exists a sequence
of allocations x = x1, . . . , xL = y and a sequence of coalitions {S1, . . . , SL−1} such that for all
l ∈ {1, . . . , L − 1}, xl →Sl xl+1 and for all i ∈ Sl, yi Pi xli.2 We refer to such a sequence of
coalitions as an indirect dominance path of coalitions (from x to y). Furthermore, we refer to the
sequence of allocations x = x1, . . . , xL = y as an indirect dominance path of allocations (from x
to y).3
2Hence, we follow the literature on myopic blocking dynamics (e.g., Roth and Vande Vate, 1990; Diamantoudi
et al., 2004; Serrano and Volij, 2008) and assume that in the sequence of allocations from x to y, coalition Sl can
enforce allocation xl+1 starting from allocation xl.
3Note that an allocation y that indirectly dominates an allocation x also indirectly dominates allocation x
according to Definition 3 in Kawasaki (2008). The converse, however, is not true (see Example 1).
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A set of allocations V ⊆ X is farsightedly internally stable if for all x, y ∈ V , y  x. Note
that every set of allocations V with cardinality |V | = 1 is farsightedly internally stable.
A set of allocations V ⊆ X is farsightedly externally stable if for all allocations x ∈ X\V
there exists an allocation y ∈ V such that y  x. Note that X is farsightedly externally stable.
A set of allocations V ⊆M is a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) farsightedly stable set if
it is farsightedly internally and externally stable.
Note that the vNM farsightedly stable sets represent Greenberg’s (1990) optimistic stable
standard of behavior (OSSB) based on the indirect dominance relation.
Lemma 1. The set of competitive allocations is farsightedly internally stable on RN
For any housing market R ∈ RN , the set of competitive allocations is farsightedly internally
stable.
To prove Lemma 1, it would suﬃce to prove that no competitive allocation farsightedly
dominates another competitive allocation. We in fact prove a slightly stronger result by showing
that any competitive allocation is farsightedly undominated.
Proof. Let x be a competitive allocation. We show that there is no allocation y with y  x.
Suppose there is an allocation y with y  x. Then, there exists a sequence of allocations
x = x1, . . . , xL = y and a sequence of coalitions {S1, . . . , SL−1} such that for all l ∈ {1, . . . , L−1},
xl →Sl xl+1 and for all i ∈ Sl, yi Pi xli. Recall that Nk (k = 1, ...,K) denotes the set of agents
that have been removed from the market after Step k in the top trading cycles algorithm that
generated allocation x. We prove that for each k = 1, ...,K,
Nk ∩ (S1 ∪ · · · ∪ SL−1) = ∅ and yNk = xNk . (1)
Then, since N = ∪k=1,...,KNk, we obtain y = x, which contradicts y  x.
Let k = 1. Suppose Nk ∩ (S1 ∪ · · · ∪ SL−1) = N1 ∩ (S1 ∪ · · · ∪ SL−1) = ∅. Let l∗ be
the index of the ﬁrst coalition on the indirect dominance path in which some member of N1
participates, i.e., l∗ := min{l : N1 ∩ Sl = ∅}. Let i ∈ N1 ∩ Sl∗ . Then, yi Pi xl∗i . Recall that
agents in N1 only trade among themselves at x. Hence, from the deﬁnition of l∗ and (E2), for
all steps l < l∗, xl∗i = x
l∗−1
i = · · · = x1i = xi. Hence, yi Pi xi, which contradicts that in the
top trading cycles algorithm all agents in N1 are assigned one of their most preferred objects.
Hence, N1∩ (S1∪· · ·∪SL−1) = ∅. Then, by (E2), for all steps l = 1, ..., L−1 and for all i ∈ N1,
yi = xL−1i = x
L−2
i = · · · = x1i = xi. So, (1) holds for k = 1.
Suppose now that for some k′, 1 < k′ ≤ K, (1) holds for all k < k′ (induction hypothesis).
We show that (1) also holds for k = k′. Assume that Nk′ ∩ (S1 ∪ · · · ∪ SL−1) = ∅. Let l∗ be
the index of the ﬁrst coalition on the indirect dominance path in which some member of Nk
′
participates, i.e., l∗ := min{l : Nk′ ∩ Sl = ∅}. Let i ∈ Nk′ ∩ Sl∗ . Then, yi Pi xl∗i . Recall that
agents in Nk
′
only trade among themselves at x. Hence, from the deﬁnition of l∗ and (E2), for
all steps l < l∗, xl∗i = x
l∗−1
i = · · · = x1i = xi. Hence, yi Pi xi. Since x is a competitive allocation,
yi ∈ N1 ∪ · · · ∪ Nk′−1. Hence, for some j ∈ N1 ∪ · · · ∪ Nk′−1, yj = xj, which contradicts
the induction hypothesis. So, Nk
′ ∩ (S1 ∪ · · · ∪ SL−1) = ∅. Then, from (E2) applied to steps
l = 1, ..., L − 1, we obtain that for all i ∈ Nk′ , yi = xL−1i = xL−2i = · · · = x1i = xi. So, (1) holds
for k = k′ as well.
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For i ∈ N , let R′i be the set of preferences of agent i over N where for any object j = i
his initial endowment is either strictly better or strictly worse than j. Formally, for Ri ∈ Ri,
Ri ∈ R′i if and only if [for all j = i, i Pi j or j Pi i]. Let R′N = ×i∈NR′i. Note that if for each
i ∈ N , Ri ∈ Ri is a (strict) linear order, then ×i∈NRi ∈ R′N .
Lemma 2. The set of competitive allocations is farsightedly externally stable on R′N
For any housing market R ∈ R′N , the set of competitive allocations is farsightedly externally
stable.
Proof. First, for any S ⊆ N and z ∈ XS , we introduce the following two directed graphs. The
“reference” (or red) graph gr(S, z) has nodes S and there is a directed edge from i ∈ S to j ∈ S
if zi = j. In other words, in gr(S, z) each agent points to the object he consumes at z. The
“best object” (or blue) graph gb(S, z) has the same set of nodes S and from each i ∈ S there is
a unique directed edge to pi := pi(S, z) where
pi(S, z) :=
{
zi if for all h, zi Ri h;
j if [j Pi zi and for all h, j Ri h] and [[j′ Pi zi and for all h, j′ Ri h] ⇒ j′ ≥ j];
i.e., pi(S, z) is the object that agent i consumes at allocation z, unless there is a strictly preferred
object, in which case pi(S, z) is the most preferred object with lowest index.4 We refer to an
agent i with pi(S, z) = i as a loop in gb(S, z).
Let x be an allocation that is not competitive. Then, we construct a competitive allocation
y such that y  x. The construction is based on the alternative application of two procedures
called Top and Trade, which are now introduced.
Procedure Top.
Input : (S, z) where S ⊆ N and z ∈ XS .
Let Sˆ := S and zˆ := z. Set yˆ = ∅. As long as there is a cycle C that is present in both gr(Sˆ, zˆ)
and gb(Sˆ, zˆ), set yˆ := (yˆ, zˆC), zˆ := zˆSˆ\C , and Sˆ := Sˆ\C.
Output : Top(S, z) := (Sˆ, zˆ, yˆ).
In other words, given a coalition S and a feasible reallocation z for S, procedure Top ﬁnds all
top trading cycles at z and creates a vector yˆ that records the assigned objects accordingly.
Note that for (Sˆ, zˆ, yˆ) = Top(S, z), zˆ ∈ XSˆ and there is no cycle in gb(Sˆ, zˆ) that is also present
in gr(Sˆ, zˆ).
Procedure Trade.5
Input : (S, z) where S ⊆ N and z ∈ XS such that there is no cycle in gb(S, z) that is also present
in gr(S, z).
Let S∗ := ∪{C : C is a cycle in gb(S, z)} = ∅. Let S0 := ∪{i : i is a loop in gb(S, z)}. Let
S∗∗ := {i ∈ S∗ : pi = zi} = {i ∈ S∗ : pi Pi zi} = ∅. Let F r(S∗) be the set of objects that can be
reached through a directed path in the graph gr(S, z) starting from some object in S∗. (Note
S∗ ⊆ F r(S∗).) For each i ∈ S deﬁne
z1i :=
{
i if i ∈ F r(S∗),
zi if i ∈ S\F r(S∗).
4One easily verifies that any other tie-breaking rule would also work.
5See Figure 1 for an illustration. The graph gb is given by the broken edges. The other edges belong to gr.
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Finally, for each i ∈ S deﬁne
z2i :=
⎧⎨
⎩
pi if i ∈ S∗,
i if i ∈ F r(S∗)\S∗,
zi if i ∈ S\F r(S∗).
Output : Trade(S, z) := (S∗, S∗∗, S0, z1, z2).
In other words, procedure Trade shifts the objects owned by coalition S∗ following the directed
cycles in gb(S, z). This is done in two steps. First, coalition S∗∗ ⊆ S∗ enforces allocation z1
over allocation z by giving each agent in F r(S∗) his endowment. Next, coalition S∗\S0 enforces
allocation z2 over allocation z1 by trading the objects according to the cycles in gb(S, z) – at
allocation z1 agents in S0 already trade objects according to loops (self-cycles) in gb(S, z) and
do not change their assignment from z1 to z2. The enforceability of the allocations z1 and z2
follows from the following claim.
F r(S∗) S∗
S∗∗
Figure 1: Illustration of procedure Trade
Claim 1: z →S∗∗ z1 and z1 →S∗\S0 z2.
Proof: We ﬁrst prove that z →S∗∗ z1. Since F r(S∗) is a union of cycles in gr(S, z), it is
suﬃcient to show that
for each j ∈ F r(S∗) there is i ∈ S∗∗ with j ∈ F r({i}). (2)
Suppose that (2) is not true. Then, there is a cycle C ⊆ F r(S∗) in gr(S, z) with C ∩ S∗∗ = ∅.
Since C ⊆ F r(S∗), there is i1 ∈ C ∩ S∗. Since C ∩ S∗∗ = ∅, i1 ∈ S∗∗. Let (i1, i2) be the edge
in gr(S, z) that starts in i1, i.e., i2 = zi1 . By deﬁnition of C and i1 ∈ C, i2 ∈ C. Since i1 ∈ S∗∗,
pi1 = zi1 . Hence, pi1 = i2 and (i1, i2) is also an edge in g
b(S, z). Hence, by deﬁnition of S∗ and
i1 ∈ S∗, i2 ∈ S∗. So, i2 ∈ C ∩ S∗. We can now repeat the previous arguments to obtain that C
is a cycle in gb(S, z). However, by assumption (of the input of the procedure Trade), there is no
cycle in gb(S, z) that is also present in gr(S, z). This contradiction leads to the conclusion that
(2) is true.
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It remains to show that z1 →S∗\S0 z2. This, however, follows immediately from (S∗\S0) ⊆
F r(S∗) being a collection of singletons in gr(S, z1) and a collection of cycles in gb(S, z). More
precisely, at allocation z1 coalition S∗\S0 carries out the trades induced by the directed cycles
in gb(S, z) and can do this without aﬀecting any other agent since S∗\S0 is a set of singletons
in gr(S, z1). 
Next, we show that if (S, z) satisﬁes the assumption in the procedure Trade, then for
(S∗, S∗∗, S0, z1, z2) = Trade(S, z), coalitions S∗∗ and S∗\S0 would indeed be willing to enforce
allocations z1 (over z) and z2 (over z1), respectively, as long as z2 is the ﬁnal allocation of the
indirect dominance path.
Claim 2: (i) For all i ∈ S∗∗, z2i Pi zi. (ii) For all i ∈ S∗\S0, z2i Pi z1i .
Proof: Part (i). Since i ∈ S∗∗ ⊆ S∗, z2i = pi. Since i ∈ S∗∗, pi Pi zi. Hence, z2i Pi zi.
Part (ii). First note that since i ∈ S∗\S0, z2i = pi = i. By deﬁnition of pi, pi Ri i. Since
Ri ∈ R′i, pi = i, and pi Ri i, it follows that pi Pi i. By deﬁnition of z1, z1i = i. Summarizing,
z2i = pi Pi i = z
1
i . 
Finally, the following algorithm constructively ﬁnds a competitive allocation y that indirectly
dominates x. Set t := 1, Nˆ := N , and xˆ := x.
Step 0 : Let (Nˆ , xˆ, y) := Top(Nˆ , xˆ) and go to Step 1.a. (Note that Nˆ = ∅ and y ∈ XN\Nˆ .)6
Step t.a : If Nˆ = ∅, then let (S∗, S∗∗, S0, z1, z2) := Trade(Nˆ , xˆ), set y := (y, z2S∗), Nˆ := Nˆ\S∗,
and xˆ := z2
Nˆ
, and go to Step t.b. Otherwise, stop.
Step t.b: If Nˆ = ∅, then let (Nˆ , xˆ, yˆ) = Top(Nˆ , xˆ), set y := (y, yˆ) and t := t + 1, and go to
Step t.a. Otherwise, stop.
In Steps 0 and t.b, the algorithm augments the allocation y by adding all top trading cycles
that are present in xˆ ∈ XNˆ . In Steps t.a, the algorithm ﬁnds an indirect dominance path from
xˆ to z2 via z1 (see Claims 1 and 2).
The algorithm terminates in a ﬁnite number of steps since in Steps t.a, S∗ = ∅ (see description
of Trade), which implies that |Nˆ | strictly decreases. (By deﬁnition of Top, in Steps t.b, |Nˆ | does
not increase.)
When the algorithm stops we have an allocation y ∈ XN . It follows directly from the
deﬁnition of Top and S∗ (in Trade) that y is a competitive allocation.
Note that a change (augmentation) in y during the algorithm is deﬁnite. Hence, it follows
directly from the deﬁnition of Top (augmentation of y by adding a part of xˆ) and Claims 1 and
2 for Trade (indirect dominance path from xˆ to z2 and adding the new trade cycles to y) that
y  x.
Our main result is that the set of competitive allocations is the unique vNM farsightedly
stable set on R′N .
Theorem 1. For any housing market R ∈ R′N , the set of competitive allocations is the unique
vNM farsightedly stable set.
6If Nˆ = ∅ then x is a competitive allocation, which is not the case.
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Proof. Recall that in the proof of Lemma 1 we show that any competitive allocation is farsight-
edly undominated. Hence, by farsightedly external dominance, the set of competitive allocations
has to be part of any vNM farsightedly stable set. Thus, by Lemma 2, the set of competitive
allocations is the unique vNM farsightedly stable set.
The following example shows that Theorem 1 is a maximal domain result. More precisely,
the example demonstrates that the set of competitive allocations need not be the unique vNM
farsightedly stable set if there exists one agent i with preferences Ri ∈ Ri\R′i, i.e., agent i is
indiﬀerent between his endowment and the endowment of some other agent.
Example 1. Maximality of domain R′N
Let R be such that 2 P1 3 P1 1, 3 P2 2 P2 1, and 1 I3 3 P3 2. Hence, agent 3’s preferences violate
the assumption in Theorem 1, i.e., R3 ∈ R′3. Straightforward calculations show that the set of
competitive allocations is Y = {y1, y2} with y1 = (2, 3, 1) and y2 = (1, 2, 3). It follows from
Lemma 1 that Y is farsightedly internally stable. We now show that Y is not farsightedly
externally stable. More precisely, we demonstrate that x = (3, 2, 1) is not indirectly dominated
by y1 or y2.
First, observe that no agent strictly prefers y2 to x. Hence, y2  x. Assume that y1  x.
Let x = x1, . . . , xL = y1 be an indirect dominance path from x to y1 and let {S1, . . . , SL−1} be
the associated indirect dominance path of coalitions. As x3 = y13 , S1 ⊆ {1, 2}. W.l.o.g. we may
assume that x2 = x1. Hence, S1 = {2}. So, S1 = {1} or S1 = {1, 2}. By (E1) for x1 →S1 x2,
yS1 ∈ XS1 . So, x2 = (1, 2, 3) or x2 = (2, 1, 3). In either case, x23 = 3. Since for all j, 3 R3 j,
we have for all l = 2, . . . , L − 1, 3 /∈ Sl. In particular, 3 = x23 = x33 = . . . = xL3 = y13 = 1; a
contradiction. Hence, y1  x.7 
7The set V = {y1, y2, x} is vNM farsightedly stable.
Proof. Farsightedly internal stability: x is not indirectly dominated by y1 and y2 (see the discussion of
Example 1) and y1 and y2 are not indirectly dominated by any allocation according to the proof of Lemma 1.
Farsightedly external stability: Note first that X\V = {(1, 3, 2), (2, 1, 3), (3, 1, 2)}. Now observe that x 
(1, 3, 2) because (1, 3, 2) →{1,3} x with 3 P1 1 and 1 P3 2, y2  (2, 1, 3) because (2, 1, 3) →{2} y2 with 2 P2 1, and
y2  (3, 1, 2) because (3, 1, 2) →{2} y2 with 2 P2 1. Hence, any allocation in X\V is indirectly dominated by an
allocation in V .
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